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Boomgaarden: Water Law - Quantification of Federal Reserved Indian Water Right

CASENOTES
WATER LAW-Quantification of Federal Reserved Indian Water
Rights-"Practicably Irrigable Acreage" Under Fire: The Search
for a Better Legal Standard. In re The General Adjudication of
All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d
76 (Wyo. 1988) aff'd mere. sub nom. Wyoming v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989).
An 1868 treaty established the Wind River Indian Reservation
without an express reservation of water.1 The language of the Second
Treaty of Fort Bridger described the Wind River Indian Reservation
("Reservation") as an "agricultural reservation,"' established for the
broader purpose of providing the Indians with a permanent homeland.
By 1905 the size of the Reservation had been reduced three separate
times from its original 44,672,000 acres. Each reduction resulted from
land sales from the Tribes to the United States Government. In the
final and most significant reduction, the Second McLaughlin Agreement of 1904, the Tribes ceded 1,480,000 acres to the United States
Government in exchange for cash payment.' Congress earmarked part
of the proceeds from that agreement to obtain state water permits for
the Indians,4 in accordance with Wyoming law.' As a result, by 1915,
1. In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System, 753 P.2d 76, 91 (Wyo. 1988) [hereinafter Big Horn].
2. Id. at 95 (citing the Second Treaty of Ft. Bridger, art. 8, 15 Stat. 673 (1869)).
This Treaty originally provided reserved lands for the Shoshone and Bannack tribes.
The Arapaho tribe settled on the Wind River Indian Reservation in 1878. Big Horn,
753 P.2d at 83. Agricultural Indian reservations are those which were established to
convert nomadic peoples to a pastoral life-to create an independent farming community as in the case of the Wind River Indian Reservation. United States v. Shoshone
Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1938).
3. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 84. The Second McLaughlin Agreement was ratified
by the Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1452, 33 Stat. 1016.
4. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1452, 33 Stat. 1016, 1020.
5. Act of December 22, 1890, ch. 8, 1890 Wyo. SEss. LAWS 100-02. Wyoming's
first legislature laid the foundation for Wyoming water law in "an act providing for
the supervision and use of the waters of the State," passed December 22, 1890. Section
34 of that act required all water users to obtain a permit. Permit applications were
made to the State Engineer on a prescribed form. The applicant was required to list
the name of the appropriator, the source from which water was to be appropriated, the
amount of water to be appropriated, the location and the character of the water works
to be developed, the estimated date that beneficial use would begin, and the purpose
for which water was to be applied. If the water was to be used for irrigation the applicant was also required to provide a description of the irrigated land. The State Engineer
issued a permit if three criteria were met: (1) the application was in proper form; (2)
there was unappropriated water in the source of supply named in the application; and,
(3) such appropriation was not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare.
Perfection of a state permit, however, involved the completion of the applicant's
proposed water distributing works, the filing of a map which described the location
and amount of the distributing works, the source of water appropriated and a legal
description of the land to which the water was being applied, and finally, the beneficial use of the appropriated water. Upon perfection, the board of control recorded a certificate of water rights on behalf of the applicant in the county clerk's office. The priority of such appropriation was the date of the filing of the application. Id.
It is interesting to note that this procedure has remained substantially unchanged
for 99 years. Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-4-501 to 502 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
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the State Engineer had issued water permits to the Indians for the irrigation of approximately 145,000 acres of reservation lands.6
Coincident with the tribal acquisition of state water rights, the
United States Supreme Court established the legal principles governing federal Indian water rights in Winters v. United States.' That case
held that when Congress established an Indian reservation, it impliedly
reserved a water right sufficient to fulfill the purpose for which the
reservation had been created. 8
A creation of federal law, Indian water rights under the Winters
reserved water rights doctrine are not subject to requirements imposed
by state law. 9 Unlike state water rights, federal reserved rights allow
the Indians to expand their water use to meet future demands of the
reservation. In reliance on Winters and notwithstanding Congress'
refusal in 1914 to provide for an expressed reserved water right for
the Reservation, the United States allowed unperfected state permits
for the irrigation of 58,000 acres of Reservation land to expire beginning in 1963.0 Perfected state-awarded water rights remained in place
for the irrigation of 87,000 acres. 1
On January 24, 1977, the State of Wyoming initiated a general adjudication aimed at quantifying the rights of more than 20,000 water
users in the Big Horn River Drainage System, 2 including those rights
claimed by the Tribes on the Wind River Indian Reservation. 3 The State
6. Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Wyoming v. United States of America, Shoshone
Tribe and Northern Arapaho Tribe of the Wind River Indian Reservation, et al. 109 S.
Ct. 2994 (1989) (No. 88-309) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner, Wyoming v. United States].
7. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
8. Id. at 577.
9. See Laird, Water Rights: The Winters Cloud over the Rockies: Indian Water
Rights and the Development of Western Energy Resources, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 155,
160-61 (1979). Most western state water rights are governed by the principle of prior
appropriation or "first in time-first in right." Those who establish their water rights
first have priority over junior rights holders in times of scarcity. Under the prior appropriation system, three factors are of critical importance: (1) The water right priority date
is the date of application for a state water permit; (2) Perfection of a state permit requires
actual diversion or appropriation of the water within a reasonable time of the issuance
of the permit; and, (3) State rights are subject to loss through nonuse. Id.
In contrast, the priority of federal reserved water rights are determined by the
date of establishment of the reservation, making these rights senior to virtually all
of the state rights. Furthermore, federal reserved water rights are created regardless
of whether or not the water has actually been diverted or put to beneficial use, cannot
be lost by nonuse, and include an amount sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the reservation into the future. Id.
10. Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2994. Beginning in 1917, state permit applicants had five years to perfect their permit; however,
the State Engineer could extend this time upon a showing of good cause. Consequently,
it was possible for permits to expire over an extended period of time. Act of February
21, 1917, ch. 119, 1917 Wyo. SESS. LAWS 200-01.
11. Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2994.
12. The Big Horn River Drainage System is essentially identical with the State
of Wyoming's Water Division No. 3. Water Division No. 3 is comprised of over thirteen
million acres located in Fremont, Hot Springs, Washakie, Big Horn and Park counties
in northwestern and west central Wyoming and includes parts of Yellowstone National
Park. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 83.
13. Id. at 84.
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of Wyoming originally filed the complaint in the District Court of the
Fifth Judicial District of Wyoming pursuant to Wyoming statute 14 and
the McCarran Amendment." The United States, claiming water rights
as trustee for the Shoshone and Arapaho tribes of the Wind River Indian
Reservation, removed the case to the United States District Court. 7
The district court remanded the adjudication to state court. 8 After denying a motion to dismiss by the United States, 9 the state district court
granted the Tribes' motion to intervene 0 and appointed a special
master. 2 '
The special master trifurcated the adjudication for purposes of
management: Phase I, federal claims by and on behalf of the Tribes
of the Reservation;2 2 Phase II, non-Indian federal claims of the United
States in its proprietary capacity; 2 and Phase III, all claims based on
state water rights evidenced by a permit or certificate. 4 In December,
1982, after four years of conferences and hearings, the special master
issued a 451-page report concerning the Phase I claims.2 The report
determined that the Reservation had been established for the purpose
of providing a permanent homeland for the Indians and recognized an
1868 implied reserved water right 26 on behalf of the Reservation for

14. WYO. STAT. § 1-37-106 (1977). The statute authorizes the state to commence
system-wide adjudication of water rights.
15. McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982). The Act waives federal immunity to the adjudication of Indian water rights in state courts.
16. The United States holds title to Indian reserved water rights in trust for the
tribe. United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1939).
17. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 84. The United States claimed that the state court was
without jurisdiction in this suit against the United States.
18. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts in the adjudication of Indian reserved rights. Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809 (1976). In Colorado
the Court held that both the language and the policy of the McCarran Amendment
dictated the inclusion of Indian rights in its provisions allowing the United States to
be named as defendant in a state adjudication proceeding. Id. at 810. The Court
reaffirmed its Coloradodecision in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, by
holding that federal courts should generally defer to state courts if the states have
initiated a comprehensive adjudication process. 463 U.S. 545, 570 (1983).
19. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 84. The Tribes were granted leave to file an amicus
curiae brief on the dismissal motion. Id.
20. Id. The United States in its capacity as trustee claimed federal reserved rights
in the amount of 570,000 acre feet for historic and future irrigation. Determining that
the United States' claims were inadequate, the Tribes filed their own supplemental
claims for an additional 1,103,000 acre feet for irrigation. Brief for the Petitioner at
6, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2994.
21. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 85.
22. Id. These claims were the sole subject of the principle case.
23. Id. For example, federal reserved rights involving Yellowstone National Park
and two National Forests. These claims were resolved by negotiation.
24. Id. Approximately 27,000 claims based on state law are still before the state
district court's master.
25. Id.
26. Id. Note that the 1868 priority date is superior to the Indians' state permits
beginning in 1905. The 1868 priority date makes the reserved rights senior to virtually every non-Indian water right in the Big Horn Basin.
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multiple uses.27 The master applied the "practicably irrigable acreage"
(PIA) standard28 to quantify those reserved water rights for agricul-

tural use.2 9

After reviewing the special master's recommendation, the Wyoming
district court rejected the recommended award of non-agricultural
reserved rights, but confirmed the master's recommended award based
on the PIA standard."0 The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the district court's use of the PIA quantification standard." The majority specifically held that "[t]he measure of the Tribes' reserved water right is
the water necessary to irrigate the practicably irrigable acreage on the
reservation." 2 Using the PIA standard, the court ultimately awarded
the Indians nearly 500,000 acre feet of water based on approximately
100,000 practicably irrigable acres. 2 The United States Supreme 2Court,
4
in a 4-4 split affirmed the Wyoming decision without opinion.
This casenote examines the merits of the PIA standard traditionally used to quantify the implied federal reserved water rights for
agricultural Indian reservations as well as the implication of the United
States Supreme Court's recent split decision regarding the appropriateness of this standard.
BACKGROUND

Reserved Water Rights
The doctrine of federally reserved Indian water rights originated
in Winters v. United States in 1908.32 The Supreme Court in Winters
held that when the federal government created an Indian reservation
27. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 85. The special master quantified and awarded reserved
rights for irrigation, stock watering, fisheries, wildlife and aesthetics, mineral and industrial, and domestic, commercial and municipal uses. Id.
28. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 101. The parties stipulated to the definition of practicably irrigable acreage as a measure of "those acres susceptible to sustained irrigation
at reasonable costs." The determination of practicably irrigable acreage therefore
requires a two-part analysis. First, in order to be classified as susceptible to sustained
irrigation both the arability and engineering feasibility of irrigating the land must be
proven. Second, the land must be shown to be irrigable at a "reasonable cost." Id.
29. Id. at 86.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 101.
32. Id. The dissent advocated a "pragmatic limitation" on the PIA standard which
would eliminate lands designated as future irrigation projects from the quantification
formula. Id. at 119 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 101, 106. The award encompassed 48,097 practicably irrigable acres
associated with five future Reservation water projects, and 54,216 practically irrigable acres currently and/or historically irrigated on the Reservation. Id. The court denied
an award of practicably irrigable acreage for two additional future projects on grounds
of economic infeasibility. Id. at 106.
34. Wyoming v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989). Justice O'Connor abstained.
Generally, the Court does not write an opinion where affirmance is by an equally divided
vote; the Court merely issues a per curiam opinion. 12 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX & B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 400.05 - 3 (2d ed. 1988). An equally divided court
affirms the lower courts judgment or decree, and has no precedential effect. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
35. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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out of public lands, the government also intended to reserve a supply
of water adequate to sustain the tribal existence through the years.6
In Winters, landowners on the upper Milk River in Montana were diverting water in such a manner as to prevent the water of the river or its
tributaries from flowing to the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation." The
Court found that the Reservation, without water, was "practically valueless,"38 contrary to the government's policy and the Indians' desire to
become a pastoral and civilized people.3 9 Therefore, by implication, the
reservation of land required a water right sufficient to fulfill the purposes for which the reservation had been created.
Although the Supreme Court recognized the reserved right doctrine
in 1908, more than fifty years passed before the Court again discussed
these significant Indian claims.4" During that period, actions involving Indian water rights were concerned mainly with the existing uses
by Indians, and did not involve the full extent of rights under the
Winters reserved rights doctrine. 4
Quantification of Reserved Rights
Winters established solid authority for the assertion of federally
reserved water rights on behalf of Indian reservations.42 The Winters
Court failed, however, to provide specific guidelines for quantifying the
Indian rights. Not until the issue resurfaced in Arizona v. California,
in 1963, did the Court directly address the quantification issue.4" An
original action in the United States Supreme Court,4 4 Arizona constituted an adjudication of the five lower-Colorado River states' legal
rights to use water from the Colorado River system.45 Although reserved
Indian water rights composed only a small portion of the overall adjudication, the Court took the opportunity to adopt an important principle defining the quantification of those rights on agricultural Indian
reservations.
The Arizona Court found, as did the Winters Court, that the reserved
water was "intended to satisfy the future as well as the present needs
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 577.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 576.
Id.

40. NATIONAL WATER

COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THm

FUTURE 474 n.1 (1973). Dur-

ing this time the lower federal courts attempted to refine the scope of Winters. See United
States v. Ahtanum Irr. D., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Walker River
Irr. D., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921);
Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v.
Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Ida. 1928).
41. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N supra note 40, at 474 n.1.
42. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
43. 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
44. Judicial power extends to controversies between two or more states, and the
United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases in which a state is
a party. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
45. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 551. The states involved were Arizona, California, New
Mexico, Nevada and Utah. Id.
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of the Indian Reservations. '46 The Court held that the "only feasible
and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage. 4 7 In adopting the PIA standard to determine
the quantity of water impliedly reserved for agricultural Indian reservations, the Court in Arizona expressly rejected a quantification standard based on "reasonable foreseeable needs."48 The Court reasoned
that a broad "need" standard would be too uncertain because "low
many Indians there will be and what their future needs will be can
only be guessed."4 9
Since Arizona, however, three United States Supreme Court cases
involving federal lands reserved for purposes other than agricultural
Indian reservations have quantified reserved rights to natural resources
using broader language of "necessity." 5 0 In Cappaertv. United States,
for example, the Supreme Court held that the quantity of water
impliedly reserved for Devil's Hole National Monument was no more
and no less than that amount necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the reserved land.5 ' Two years later, in United States v. New Mexico,
the Supreme Court stated that the quantity of water impliedly reserved
for the Gila National Forest was only the amount necessary to fulfill
the primary purpose of the reserved land, no more.52 In addition, New
Mexico held that when federal reserved water rights require a gallonfor-gallon reduction in the amount of water available for non-reservation
impact must be considered in the quantification of those
users, this
53
rights.

In the third related case, Washington v. Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Association, the natural resource being quantified
was anadromous fish in tribal fishing grounds. Washington held that
the central principle with regard to quantification of Indian reserved
rights to a natural resource is that reserved rights secure only that
46. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600.

47. Id. at 601.
48. Id. at 600-01.
49. Id. at 601.
50. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
51. 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976). Devil's Hole is a deep limestone cavern and pool
declared a National Monument in part to preserve the habitat of a unique species of
desert fish. The United States brought action when nearby landowners threatened the
pupfish habitat by lowering the water level in the pool. The Supreme Court affirmed
the district court and Ninth Circuit holdings which permanently enjoined the landowners
from pumping only that amount which would lower the level of the pool below the point
which was crucial for spawning. Id. at 135, 141.
52. 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978) (quoting Cappaert,426 U.S. at 141).
53. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705. This principle regarding the law of federal
reserved rights has been coined the "sensitivity doctrine" by lower courts, based upon
Mr. Justice Powell's oft quoted dissent in New Mexico which states: "I agree with the
Court that the implied-reservation doctrine should be applied with sensitivity to its
impact upon those who have obtained water rights under state law and Congress' general
policy of deference to state water law." Id. at 718 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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amount of the
resource necessary to provide the Indians with a moder4
ate living..

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's apparent needs-based
approach to quantification of federal reserved rights in Cappaert,New
Mexico and Washington, the more specific PIA standard has been
mechanically applied in the lower courts in at least four subsequent
cases involving Indian water rights. 5 In addition, the Supreme Court
declined an opportunity to re-examine the PIA standard in Arizona v.
California11.56 In Arizona II, the Court expressed fear that an urge
to relitigate the PIA standard in consideration of new claims for "omitted" lands 57 could open a "Pandora's Box." 58
PRINCIPAL CASE

The appropriateness of the PIA standard was a relatively insignificant issue in light of the overall complexity of Phase I of the Big Horn
adjudication.59 Furthermore, the choice regarding the PIA issue seemed
clear. The Wyoming Supreme Court could either adopt the traditional
PIA standard, or it could tailor a standard which would quantify the
amount of "water necessary to meet the reservation's 'minimal needs'
and to ensure that its 'primary purpose' is not 'entirely defeated.' "'0
The United States and the Tribes argued that Arizona v. California was controlling precedent for the quantification of reserved water
rights for agricultural Indian reservations. 1 Although the State of
Wyoming stipulated to the definition of "practicably irrigable acreage"
and did not originally challenge the Arizona holding, it did not accept
the PIA standard as being the only consideration in quantifying the
Indians' reserved rights to water from the Big Horn River System.2
54. 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979). This litigation necessitated the interpretation of
several Indian treaties entered into by the United States and various tribes in 1854
and 1855. The treaties reserved a right in the Indians to take fish from tribal fishing
grounds in the Washington state area. Id. at 662.
55. See United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1983); Colville Confederated Tribes
v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,48 (9th Cir. 1981); Montana v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 764 (Mont. 1985).
56. 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
57. Id. at 615. "[O]mitted" lands referred to those lands for which water rights
could have been sought in the earlier litigation. Id.
58. Id. at 615, 625.
59. 753 P.2d 76 (1988). Some of the other Indian water rights issues addressed
by the Wyoming Supreme Court included jurisdiction, estoppel, congressional intent
to reserve water, treaty interpretation to determine the actual purpose of the Wind
River Indian Reservation, and the scope of reserved rights regarding ground water,
not to mention the many evidentiary and technical issues surrounding the actual quantification process. Id.
60. Brief of Appellant State of Wyoming at 51, Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76 (1988) (No.
85-203, 204, 205, 217, 218, 225, 226) (relying on Cappaert,426 U.S. 128, 141; New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant, Big Horn].
61. Brief of the Shoshoni and Northern Arapaho Tribes As Appellees at 103, Big
Horn, 753 P.2d 76 (1988) (No. 85-203, 204, 205, 217, 218, 225, 226) [hereinafter Brief
of Appellees, Big Horn].
62. Brief of Appellant at 40, Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76.
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Rather, the State advocated that the court was obliged to find that any
amount quantified using the PIA standard was also "necessary" to meet
the reservation's minimal needs. The state argued the court need only
reserve a quantity of water necessary to insure that the primary purpose of the reservation not be entirely defeated and that the Indians
could maintain a moderate standard of living.63 In other words, the State
relied on Cappaert, New Mexico and Washington to advocate a pragmatic ceiling on PIA-based quantification.
Given these options, the Wyoming Supreme Court perfunctorily
adopted an unrestrained PIA standard as the appropriate quantification tool. 4 The court relied solely on Arizona v. California and
reaffirmed the value of certainty believed inherent in the PIA standard. Itrejected any type of needs test as too uncertain. 5 The court
acknowledged the "necessity" language in the Cappaertline of cases,
but implied that if the United States Supreme Court had wanted to
change or modify the PIA standard in light of these decisions, it would
have done so in Arizona 11.66 Furthermore, the Wyoming Supreme Court

held that the PIA-based quantification evidenced sufficient sensitivity to the water needs of other water users. 7
The PIA issue took on new proportions when presented to the United
States Supreme Court because it was the only issue upon which the
Court granted certiorari.6 ' The parties' basic arguments remained
unchanged; however, in light of the ultimate importance of this single
issue, the arguments of both sides were more fully developed.
On appeal, the State of Wyoming used the "necessity" language
of the later cases to support its argument for a quantification approach
substantially different from the PIA standard.6 9 The State of Wyoming
sought to replace the PIA quantification standard with a tailored
approach which could be adapted to the reservation's minimum needs
as derived from its primary purpose. 0 The State argued that a tailored
approach would be no more difficult for the trial court to apply than
the "excruciating evidentiary exercise involved in determining practicably irrigable acreage."'" In addition, the State proposed that a
tailored approach would more appropriately recognize the "sensitivity doctrine" established in New Mexico, 72 and prevent an unjustified

windfall 73for the United States as well as for agricultural Indian reservations.

63. Id.
64. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 101.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 112.
68. 109 S. Ct. 863 (1989).
69. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2994.

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 47.
Id.
See supra note 53.
Brief for the Petitioner at 31, 35, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2994.
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The Tribes and the United States responded to these arguments
by taking the position that a tailored approach to quantification would
be unworkable and "fundamentally inconsistent" with the governing
7 4 They also denied that any unjustified
law of Arizona v. California.
windfall would be realized from the quantification based on PIA. 5
According to the Tribes and the United States, the PIA standard was
well-founded in legal precedent and had generated substantial reliance.
They argued that the PIA standard should not be modified or replaced
because it assures an orderly, efficient and certain resolution of Indian
reserved water rights disputes. 6
An equally divided United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Wyoming Supreme Court's application of the unrestrained PIA standard without opinion. 7
ANALYSIS

Few issues rouse political passion and public interest like those
involving water rights in the American West. Water is vested with symbolic, cultural and economic importance; it is the very basis of community existence. However, water is a finite resource with water abundance being the exception rather than the rule in the arid West. An
expanding urban population, energy development, agriculture and
fragile state economies place increasing demands on the allocation and
management policies involving this precious natural resource.
The economic well-being of many Western states and communities,
as well as the status of many Indian tribes, depends in large part on
an equitable and efficient resolution of water issues. Accordingly, the
quantification of federal reserved water rights of Indian reservations
has been a major issue in Western water adjudications during the past
decade. 8
The Western states' interest in quantification of Indian reserved
water rights is substantial. Although much of the water claimed by
Indians under the reserved rights doctrine has never been appropri74. Brief for the United States at 9, Wyoming v. United States, et. al. 109 S. Ct.
2994 (1989) (No. 88-309) [hereinafter Brief for the United States, Wyoming v. United

States].

75. Brief for Tribal Respondents at 43, Wyoming v. United States, et. al. 109 S.
Ct. 2994 (1989) (No. 88-309) [hereinafter Brief for the Tribes, Wyoming v. United States].
76. Brief for the United States at 48, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2994.
77. 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989). Justice O'Connor took no part in the decision. See
J. MOORE, H. BENDIx & B. RINGLE supra note 34.
78. Numerous Indian claims are presently in litigation or negotiation. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs budgeted $10.53 million to support these claims during fiscal year
1989. While Indian claims for federal reserved water rights are concentrated in Arizona, Montana, Washington, South Dakota, Idaho, and Utah (estimated claims exceed
500,000 acre feet per year), California, Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Wyoming confront substantial Indian claims as well. Divided Court,
Divided Region: Indian Water Claims after Big Horn, 3 WATER STRATEGIST 3 (1989);
WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 93 (1984).
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ated or used by the tribes,"9 an inherent conflict exists between state
appropriative rights and the Tribes' implied federal reserved rights."
"The federal reserved right is not like other water rights in the West.
It is not on record, not fixed in size, not dependent on beneficial use." 8'
Consequently, the Indians' reserved water rights are seen as creating
a cloud of uncertainty over the legal availability of water for the use
of those possessing junior state water certificates. Such uncertainty disinvestment and water works development by non-Indian
courages
82
users.

Quantification through adjudication, therefore, provides Western
states with a means by which to attain a reasonable degree of certainty
regarding the scope and quantity of the Indians' federal reserved water
rights. Quantification also facilitates state recordkeeping and supervision of water distribution among lawful claimants according to their
respective rights. In addition, the quantity of water impliedly reserved
for Indian reservations is a crucial factor in the states' assessment of
surplus water available to intending appropriators. 3
To further its interests in the certainty of state water rights and
non-Indian economic development, the State of Wyoming sought to
minimize the tribal reserved right claims in the Big Horn adjudication.8 4 The attorney generals in ten Western states and numerous
municipalities and water authorities supported the State of Wyoming
in its position.85
In opposition, the Tribes sought to maximize their allotment of federally reserved water during the Big Horn adjudication.86 Not unlike
most contemporary Indian tribes, the Shoshone and Arapaho of the
Wind River Indian Reservation faced stark economic conditions. Water
is money. An award of significant quantities of water under the reserved
rights doctrine would give the Tribes the potential to become a viable
political and fiscal force. The Native American Rights Fund, the
National Congress of American Indians and nearly 20 tribes supported
the Wind River Indian Reservation tribes.8 7
Big Horn was the first Indian water quantification adjudication to
be completed since Arizona v. California.88 Despite its potential to
79. Indian water rights have been largely unquantified and unused because the

Indians are dependent on federal assistance and have lacked the capital for construction of water works projects necessary to put their water to use. J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, WATER
IN THE WEST-WHAT INDIAN WATER MEANS TO THE WEST 7 (1982).

80. See supra note 9.
81. Trelease, FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54
474 (1977).

82. See

WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL,

DENVER

L.J. 473,

supra note 78, at 121-24.

83. See Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., 241 U.S. 440, 448 (1916).
84. Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76; Brief for Petitioner at 7, Wyoming v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 2994.
85. Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 1.
86. Brief for the Tribes at 49, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2994.
87. Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 1.

88. Getches, Foreword to
MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK

AMERICAN INDIAN RESOURCES INSTITUTE, TRIBAL WATER

at xv (1988).
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become clarifying precedent, in the final analysis Big Horn will likely
be viewed as just another episode in the Court's search for an equitable quantification standard.89
The established legal precedent of Winters" and Arizona9l made
it relatively easy for the Wyoming Supreme Court to summarily affirm
the utilization of the PIA standard in the Big Horn adjudication. In
attempting to convince the court to reevaluate the PIA standard, the
92
State of Wyoming was forced to argue policy more than precedent.
Notwithstanding the pragmatic appeal of Wyoming's policy argument
to limit reserved water rights to the actual needs of the reservation,
a quantification standard tailored to meet the minimal needs as they
currently exist on each agricultural Indian reservation 3 was entirely
inconsistent with the Winters doctrine itself. Winters provides for a reservation's future as well as present water needs. The State's proposed
tailored approach to quantification based on actual need is difficult to
reconcile with the requisite sensitivity to the Indians' future needs.
The courts' objective when resolving conflicting quantification
interests like those represented in the Big Horn adjudication has been
to formulate a quantification standard which, consistent with Winters,
would accommodate the past, present and future water needs of the
reservation in relation to its original purpose. At the same time the
ideal quantification standard would make possible the determination
of a fixed quantity of water so as to remove the cloud of uncertainty
inhibiting non-Indian water development. The United States Supreme
Court in Arizona concluded, as did the Wyoming Supreme Court, that
the PIA standard fit the bill.94
A standard based on irrigable acreage was clearly related to the
original purpose of the agricultural reservations to transform the
"nomadic and uncivilized" Indians into a "pastoral and civilized" agrarian society. 95 In addition, the PIA standard seemed a fair way to put
89. In Winters the Court's primary concern was addressing Congress' failure to
create express water rights for Indian reservations. The Court was concerned with establishing the existence of rather than the quantity of the Indians' reserved water rights.
Consequently, parameters of the Winters reserved rights doctrine, such as quantification, were left to judicial determination-case law which is fact specific, sporadic and
often vague. See WESTERN

STATES WATER

COUNCIL,

supra note 78, at 10-11.

90. The Winters reserved rights doctrine is an 80 year old rule of property law
established by the United States Supreme Court. It was unlikely that the Wyoming
Supreme Court would modify a rule of this nature without extraordinary justification.
See Collins, The Future Courseof the Winters Doctrine,56 U. COLO. L. REV. 481 (1985).
91. Arizona was the first and only United States Supreme Court authority on the
question of quantification of Indian reserved water rights. The Court summarily adopted

the PIA standard as "the only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the
reservations can be measured." Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601.
92. The Cappaertline of cases relied upon by the State of Wyoming was distinguishable in that none of those cases involved federal reserved water rights for an
agricultural Indian reservation. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
93. Brief of Appellant at 48, 53, Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76; Brief for the Petitioner

at 47, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2994.

94. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601; Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 101.

95. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
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a ceiling on the open-ended Winters rights. "Practicably irrigable acreage" was quantifiable, not limited to present use, and a formula which
did not necessitate predicting the future needs of Indian reservations.
The courts found the PIA standard to preserve the full extent of the
water rights impliedly reserved by the United States and "to establish water rights of a fixed magnitude and priority so as to provide certainty for both the United States and non-Indian users." 96 Given this
precedent, the United States Supreme Court's review of Big Horn on
the PIA issue alone came as a surprise.

Because the Court did not issue an opinion,9" the reason(s) for granting plenary review remain unknown; however, two interrelated possibilities exist. First, at least four current justices9" may have perceived
that the issue of quantification based on practicably irrigable acreage
9 9
The second
was not fully presented or carefully considered in Arizona.
explanation is that four justices believed that the problems raised by
the PIA standard outweigh the benefit of "certainty" inherent in a
measurable physical entity such as irrigable acreage."'
The Court adopted the PIA standard in Arizona because it allowed
a present water allocation that would be appropriate for future water
needs. The Arizona Court failed, however, to provide adequate guidelines necessary for efficient and equitable application of the PIA standard. The just determination of practicably irrigable acreage requires
fixed parameters with regard to technological standards for irrigation
or economic feasibility."0 The necessary legal guidelines are difficult
96. S.RIFKIND,
1960).

SPECIAL MASTER REPORT

265, Arizona v. California (December 5,

97. See supra note 34.

98. The Supreme Court grants plenary review of a certiorari case if a minimum
of four Justices favor granting the petition. This longstanding judicial practice is known
as the Rule of Four. R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
§ 5.4 (6th ed. 1986).
99. Several factors point to a less than adequate consideration of the PIA issue
by the Arizona Court. First, Arizona constituted a complex of interstate lawsuits in
which the quantification of Indian reserved rights was only a minor issue. Second, the
report of Special Master Rifkind emphasized the controversial nature of the PIA standard and suggested that his findings regarding the PIA standard were limited to that
particular case. S. RmKINn, supra note 96, at 262-65. Third, the Court summarily adopted
the special master's findings regarding the PIA standard, disposing of the issue in a
single paragraph of a 57 page opinion. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601. Finally, in a dissenting opinion Justices Harlan and Stewart parenthetically expressed "some misgivings
regarding the amounts of water allocated to the Indian reservations." Arizona, 373
U.S. at 603 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
For a more complete discussion of this argument, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the
State of California and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California in Support of Petitioner at 6-13, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2994.
100. This hypothesis is supported by the ultimate 4-4 split vote, demonstrating that
the Wyoming and Amici arguments scored points with at least four of the justices.
101. WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, supranote 78, at 95; AM. INDIAN RESOURCES
INST., supra note 88, at 143. The standards referred to include but are not limited to:
(1) Arability variables such as depth to barrier, maximum slope, hydraulic conductivity,
barrier definition and maximum drain spacing standards. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 102;
(2) Engineering feasibility factors such as climate base and project efficiency esti-
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if not impossible to ascertain, however, due to "conceptual and evidential" problems with the PIA standard itself."2
The conceptual flaw of the PIA standard is that it neglects the value
of water. °3 Due to its limited supply, water has been increasingly viewed
as a commodity in Western states.' 4 As such, water policy-makers are
becoming more sensitive to supply and demand economics. By exclud10 5
ing the value of water when assessing the feasibility of irrigation,
the PIA standard identifies economically unrealistic water use. Consequently, the Indians' PTA-based water claims may easily exceed the
available supply.'0 ° For example, in Arizona, potential Indian water
claims based on PIA exceed 30 million acre feet per year. In contrast,
the dependable water supply in Arizona is roughly 5 million acre feet
per year.0 7 Such unrealistic claims are tremendous cause for state
government concern and would do little to further the efficient and
equitable resolution of the issue.
If, however, the PIA standard could be refined to incorporate the
value of water so that acreage would be "practicably irrigable" only
if an irrigation project was profitable enough to justify paying the market price for water,' ° the standard would violate the reserved rights
doctrine. 9 Winters guaranteed the Indians sufficient water to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation into the future and in no way limited
the supply to the amount that the Indians could afford to purchase on
the open market." 0 The nature of reserved water rights is independent
of the value of the resource. Fashioning an economically reasonable
quantification standard consistent with a legal doctrine giving the
Indians a perpetual option to expand their water use is an enigmatic
task-most likely an impossible task.
mates. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 102-03; and, (3) Economic feasibility factors such as crop
yield data, management and labor cost estimates, and discount rates. Big Horn, 753
P.2d at 103-05.
102. Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 11, 13.
103. This is not to imply that the states' prior appropriation system is market based.
However, the requirement of beneficial use which governs the quantification of state
water rights is inherently more sensitive to the dynamics of supply and demand than
the open-ended Indian reserved rights.
104. A tension exists between two fundamental water value concepts. From a commodity perspective, like oil and gas, the value of water has been reduced to dollars
and cents with a mounting pressure to have water move to the highest bidder. In contrast, water has been traditionally viewed as a unique natural resource with a special
value not reducible to monetary figures. Proponents of the community value concept
resist the commodity approach in order to protect their lifestyles and cultures from water
commercialization. See GETCHES, supra note 88, at 18.
105. A PIA analysis focuses on three irrigation components: soil arability, engineering feasibility, and economic feasibility of investment. The available water supply or
theoretical cost of the water itself is not taken into consideration. See Divided Court,
Divided Region, supra note 78, at 13.
106. Id. at 13.
107. WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, supra note 78, at 95.
108. Theoretically, water demands would then equal available supplies. Divided
Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 13.
109. Id.
110. Winters, 207 U.S. 564; Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 13.
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The failure to account for the value of water is not the only weakness of the PIA standard. As the State of Wyoming pointed out, the
concept of "practicably irrigable acreage" isdeceivingly simple.11' The
true complexity of the PIA standard is not reflected in the courts' opinions. In Arizona, the special master defined "practicably irrigable" simply as that quantity of water required to make the lands productive
and usable when needed to support a reservation's economy." 2 The special master for Arizona II was only slightly more specific when he
defined "practicably irrigable" as "economically feasible."'1 3 The Big
Horn Adjudication provided the most explicit definition. The parties'
stipulated definition of "practicably irrigable acreage" required an analysis of the feasibility of sustained irrigation as well as the economic
feasibility of the project." 4 What the simplicity of these definitions fails
and
to reveal are the problems inherent in proving the economic
5
engineering feasibility components of the PIA standard."
The difficulty of proving economic feasibility illustrates the nature
of these problems. A PIA feasibility analysis can be easily manipulated
to either maximize or minimize the reserved water claim. Small differences in the economic variables used to compute cost/benefit ratios can
lead to very different feasibility conclusions."' For example, a 1% variance in discount rate estimates can mean the difference between economic feasibility and a nonviable irrigation project." 7 Expert testimony
during the Big Horn adjudication proposed discount rates ranging from
1% - 11%."' It follows that the Indians' evidence to maximize their allotment or the States' evidence to minimize the Indian allotment is limited
only by the ingenuity of counsel and their experts." 9
A court lacks the expertise necessary to define critical economic
parameters; therefore, final quantification inevitably depends on the
special master's choice between the parties' proposed findings-of-fact
that are within the realm of competent economic studies. 2 ° This type
111. Brief for Petitioner at 40, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2994.
112. S. RIFKIND, supra note 96, at 262.
113. Brief for the Petitioner at 40 n.62, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2994.
114. See supra note 28.
115. See Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 100-12 for an illustration of the complex evidentiary issues presented to the court. See also GETCHES, supra note 88, at 143-54.
116. Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 13, 14. See also Brief for Petitioner at 39-46, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2994. Examples of the economic
variables which can greatly affect the overall economic analysis include: discount rate,
crop prices, estimated cost of the proposed irrigation project, available technology. Variable evidence concerning engineering feasibility and irrigation efficiency requirements
may also impact the overall economic analysis.
117. Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 13.
118. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 104.
119. See Brief for Petitioner at 39, Wyoming v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2994.
120. Divided Court,Divided Region, supra note 78, at 13. PIA claims are ultimately
won or lost with the special master. When presented with a sufficiency of evidence issue
on appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that it "looks only at the evidence most
favorable to the prevailing party, giving to it every favorable inference, and leaving
out of consideration entirely evidence in conflict therewith." Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 89.
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of "we win-you lose" resolution encourages the exploitation of feasibility evidence and does little to foster the cooperation between the
states and tribes necessary for practical resolution of water quantification issues. 2 '
One other pragmatic problem with the PIA standard deserves mention. The PIA standard is consistent with the Winters holding that
reserved water rights be quantified with regard to the original purpose of the reservation. However, a standard premised on agricultural
use of water ignores the fact that expanding production of agricultural
commodities is currently unprofitable in most areas in the country.'2 2
This inherent tension between an 80 year old legal doctrine and modern
economic reality is enhanced by unresolved issues regarding the
Indians' authority to market their water off-reservation and their
authority to pursue alternative on-reservation uses.'2 2
As illustrated by these conceptual and evidential problems, the
quantification of reserved rights is not amenable to litigation based
on the feasibility analyses envisioned by the PIA standard.'2 4 The
United States Supreme Court's split decision on the PIA issue as
presented in Big Horn demonstrates that no pure and simple legal stan-

dard exists that respects the special nature of reserved water rights.

5

The Court's indecision in Big Horn has led to widespread speculation
121. "Cooperation rather than combat will lead to solving practical problems with
practical solutions, instead of prolonged disputes that ultimately award one party a
paper victory that does not readily translate into 'wet water'." Getches, Management
and Marketingof Indian Water: From Conflict to Pragmatism,58 U. COLO. L. REV. 515,
548 (1988).
122. See id. at 518.
123. No federal statute authorizes the Indians to sell or lease their water separate
from the land. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 100. Some believe that the Nonintercourse Act
which forbids conveyance of Indian land applies to Indian water right transactions as
well. Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 11. The majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court let stand the district court's holding which prohibited exportation of reserved surfaced waters, but deferred on the exportation of ground water issue.
The dissent, however, was split on this issue. Justice Thomas would limit reserved water
use to the territorial boundaries of the reservation. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 119 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). District Judge Hanscum, on the other hand, would permit the sale of
water off the reservation if such marketing contributed to the progress and development of the reservation. Big Horn,753 P.2d at 135 (Hanscum, dissenting). The Indians
will probably need to litigate their right to market their water off-reservation.
The Indians' right to shift water use on the reservation is less controversial, but
still lacking solid legal authority. Although Arizona allowed shifts of uses on the reservation, the Court's 1979 Supplemental Decree was based on a stipulated agreement
among the parties. 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979). The Wyoming Supreme Court majority,
consistent with Arizona, limited quantification of the Indians' reserved rights to that
amount necessary for agricultural and related purposes; however, they hedged the question of the Indians' right to shift the usage once quantified. Big Horn,753 P.2d at 98-99.
In his dissent, Justice Thomas stated that he did "not agree that reserved water rights
... should be limited in the manner suggested by the majority," and that the reserved
rights should assume "any use that is appropriate to the Indian homeland as it progresses
and develops." Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 119 (Thomas, J., dissenting). It may be that the
Indians will need to litigate this right in the future as well.
124. Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 13.
125. Id.
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that the PIA standard's days are numbered. The inherent "certainty"
of the PIA standard, applauded in Arizona, has eroded into uncertainty
as to its legal credibility. This uncertainty will have a profound impact
on the future course of western water adjudications.
The division of the United States Supreme Court has opened the
door to numerous petitions for review as these adjudications grind their
way through the state courts. Facing enormous Indian water claims
based on "practicably irrigable acreage,"',2 the Western states are
tempted to present "the" case which will convince the Court to abandon or refine the PIA standard. Western Indian tribes will resist such
efforts, having relied on the PIA standard as the foundation of their
claims for over 25 years. Furthermore, the economic welfare of those
tribes whose reserved rights were adjudicated in the Arizona and Big
Horn actions may depend in large part on the finality of those decisions.
With their economic and political health on the line, the states and
tribes should proceed with caution. As they plan their next moves, the
court should encourage, and the parties should strive to achieve, cooperation in designing practical solutions for the mutual benefit of Indians
and non-Indians. Additional litigation geared toward the search for a
"quick-fix" legal standard or "blanket formula" would be counterproductive"'-an expense of time, energy and resources which could
8
be better utilized in the negotiated settlement process." Moreover,

while the PIA standard has been shown to be a less than perfect means
by which to quantify Indian reserved water rights in the litigation context, it is a useful and appropriate starting point for equitable negotiated
agreements.
126. See supra note 78.
127. See Divided Court, Divided Region, supranote 78, at 15; Tarlock, One River,
Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 631,
635 (1987).
128. Notwithstanding its disadvantages, many commentators view negotiated set-

tlement as the most efficient and equitable process by which to resolve Indian water
rights issues. The basic arguments in favor of settlement negotiation as the optimum
forum for quantification of Indian reserved water rights are as follows:
Litigation of this issue has proven to be complicated, expensive and inconclusive.
Frought with delays, litigation generally produces only partial, often theoretical answers
or "paper" rights, prolonging the uncertainty which disserves the tribes as well as the
states. "Paper" water rights benefit the tribes only to the extent that they can develop
water works and irrigation projects, pursue alternative on-reservation uses and market their water.
Negotiated settlement proceedings, although costly and time consuming, are flexible and therefore more responsive to the particular needs of each different state-tribal
conflict. In addition, negotiated settlements allocate water resources in light of economic reality thereby providing the parties with actual rather than theoretical access
to water. Whereas litigation is a win-lose proposition, negotiation allows the interested
parties direct control over quantification decisions.
Proponents point out that negotiation is typically the final forum even for those
claims supposedly resolved by the courts. The current negotiation of usage and transfer issues between the State of Wyoming and Shoshone and Arapaho tribes is a good
illustration of this point. See Divided Court,Divided Region, supranote 78, at 14-15;
Getches, supra note 121, at 515, 517, 520, 548-49; Tarlock, supra note 127; WESTERN
STATES WATER COUNCIL,

supra note 78, at 118-21; AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PRO-

GRAM, INC., INDIAN WATER POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
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Negotiated settlements of Indian reserved water right claims should
commence with an established legal standard because legal principles
define credible bargaining positions. 2 ' The Winters doctrine provides
the legal framework for legitimate negotiations aimed at quantifying
tribal reserved water rights. As discussed, "practicably irrigable acreage" is an established legal standard consistent with that framework.13 °
Since negotiation between the interested parties can acheive outcomes not attainable through litigation,131 the PIA standard should be
viewed as a means to prompt negotiated settlements rather than a quantification tool to be applied by the courts. Using the PIA standard for
this purpose would not eliminate problematic feasibility analyses;
however, the parties would be more likely to employ realistic economic
variables since their analysis would be for the purpose of defining their
32
bargaining positions rather than to persuade a special master.'
Before the states and tribes can be induced to alter their strategies, the Court must acknowledge its limited competence to define and
apply the PIA standard 3 ' while at the same time certify the value of
the PIA standard as a springboard for negotiated settlement. Accepting this view, the Court should seize the first opportunity to reassert
the credibility of the PIA standard in the context described. Once the
Court validates "practicably irrigable acreage" as the best available
quantification tool, strategies can readily be changed to use the PIA
standard to effectuate a cooperative, equitable and efficient resolution
of the reserved rights quantification issue via negotiation.
CONCLUSION

Federal reserved water on Indian reservations spells political power
and economic gain to many tribes in the American West. Understandably, the tribes are anxious to quantify this valuable asset so that they
may proceed with economic development projects. Many Western states
are in need of economic development as well. Consequently, the states
are anxious to expunge the uncertainty created by the unquantified
129. Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 11.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
131. See supra note 128.
132. Divided Court, Divided Region, supra note 78, at 14-15.
133. Three elements contribute to the courts' lack of competence regarding application of the PIA standard and quantification of Indian reserved water rights: (1) The
technical nature of the evidence. Determination of practicably irrigable acreage is dependent upon a multitude of technical factors which change constantly and are subject
to reasonable disagreement among the experts. (2) The court cannot appropriate funds
for water development on the Indian reservations. The water awarded under the reserved
rights doctrine only benefits the Indians to the extent that they can construct water
works and irrigation projects. Through negotiation the tribes can bargain for the political support of non-Indians for Congressional appropriations. (3) The court is not in a
position to delegate water use/water marketing authority. Again, negotiation provides
the tribes with a vehicle by which to bargain for marketing/alternative use rights or
at least the incentive to solicit the political support of non-Indians. See Divided Court,
Divided Region, supra note 78, at 15.
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Indian water rights. This uncertainty substantially interferes with the
development of state and private water projects as well as water
management programs and administration of state water rights.
Tremendous amounts of time and money are being spent by the
states, tribes and federal government toward the litigation of the
reserved rights quantification issue. Due to the United States Supreme
Court's failure to clarify the law when presented the opportunity in
the Big Horn adjudication, time and money will likely continue to funnel
into the litigation process. Now is an appropriate time for the interested
parties to reevaluate their positions in light of the Big Horn setback.
A race to the courthouse in search of a better quantification standard is contrary to the interests of Indians and non-Indians. Despite
its conceptual and evidential flaws, the PIA standard is a useful quantification tool when properly limited and when employed in the optimum forum. As demonstrated by the courts' recent struggle, the most
suitable forum is the bargaining table rather than the courtroom. Litigation is a win-lose proposition with the ultimate reserved water award
akin to the lottery. Negotiation is the vehicle by which the interests
of Indians and non-Indians will most efficiently and equitably be served.
Notwithstanding the judicial uncertainty surrounding the PIA standard, "practicably irrigable acreage" can and should be used by the
parties to define their bargaining positions before negotiating the quantity of water reserved for agricultural Indian reservations. A determination of practicably irrigable acreage as step one in the negotiated
settlement process would ensure that negotiations remain within the
legal framework mandated by the Winters reserved water rights doctrine. The Court's timely stamp of approval on this proposal would
encourage the many states and tribes involved in this type adjudication to invest their time and money in a pragmatic, cooperative endeavor
rather than counter-productive legal combat.
LYNNETTE J. BOOMGAARDEN
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